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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Figure 1 shows the total value of the worlds nancial assets (including bank deposits, government
and private debt securities, and equity securities), which stood at $195 trillion at the end of 2007,
according to the McKinsey Global Institute (2009). This $195 trillion is the total amount of
capital intermediated through the worlds banks and capital markets, and made available by
them to households, business, and governments. Moreover, as the lower panel of Figure 1 shows,
banks have been the most important nancial intermediaries since 1990, on average intermediating
33% of global nancial assets, while capital markets have intermediated 26% of total global assets
over the same period, on average. Therefore, given that banks are directly connected (I address
this point below) and are among the most important nancial intermediaries in an economy, on
average, as indicated by Figure 1, then the malfunctioning of such connections can have dire
consequences for any nancial system, as the current nancial crisis has demonstrated.
Figure 1: Global Financial Assets ($ Trillion, using 2008 exchange rates for all years)
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For example, the asset side of a banks balance sheet contains common exposures in the in-
terbank deposit market. Therefore, large losses due to exogenous causes, like a large company
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breaking an agreement to pay back a syndicated loan, leads to a succession of events instanta-
neously distressing a substantial fraction of the banking sector. Moreover, since banks perform
related activities, they are also ultimately coupled due to their common exposition to similar
macro-risk drivers like the short-term interest rate and "cross-market rebalancing" e¤ects. This
means that the asset side of a banksbalance sheet clings to the same risk factors albeit in di¤erent
proportions, where the pressure to diversify risk is the underlying motive for risk-sharing rather
than risk-concentration. Paradoxically, while diversication reduces the frequency of individual
bank failures (i.e. smaller shocks can be easily borne by the system), it makes the banking system
prone to systemic breakdowns in case of very large (non-macro) shocks.1
On the other hand, the liability-side of balance sheets is even more alike than the asset side,
since the liability side largely consists of bank deposits. Accordingly, short-term interest rate
movements encourage substitution between asset categories; and therefore, can quickly change
the size of deposits held by the public. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) point out that a vital role
of banks is to o¤er deposits that are more liquid than the assets under management. The main
reason banks create liquid deposits, when compared to the assets they hold, is for insurance
purposes; that is, they force depositors to share the risk of liquidating early, even if it is at a loss.
The Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model shows that o¤ering these demand deposits gives way to
bank runsif too many depositors withdraw; and for this reason, the values of bank portfolios
co-move (either through contagion following an idiosyncratic shock, or owing to a macroeconomic
shock such as tighter monetary policy). To solve the problems associated with a bank run, deposit
guarantee funds have been installed, and nancial authorities have committed considerable e¤ort
to monitoring and regulating the banking industry, where in recent times there has been a trend
towards focusing on the macro-prudential perspective of banking regulation (see Aspachs et al.,
2007; Goodhart et al., 2005, 2006; Lehar, 2005). However, there remain important questions to
be answered regarding the stability of any nancial system. As the current crisis has highlighted,
regulators and academics do not fully understand how risk is distributed within a nancial system,
1The interconnectedness within the banking system stems from either a direct channel such as interbank lending
(see, for example, Allen and Gale, 2000; Dasgupta, 2004), or an indirect channel through common exposures via
individual diversication e¤ects (see de Vries, 2005).
3
and there is "insu¢ cient" knowledge about the e¤ects and desirability of regulatory measures.
If we were able to know the risk exposure of di¤erent risk factors, then we would be able to
better assess the impact of adverse shocks to a system; however, we do not yet have an accepted
quantication or time-series for measuring nancial stability. Despite this shortcoming, what is
most frequently employed as an alternative is an "after the fact" assessment of whether a crisis
has occurred. This dichotomous measure is then used to gauge whether common risk factors
preceded, perhaps even causing, such crises, and then to evaluate which o¢ cial responses have
best mitigated the crisis in question. However, such an approach is fraught with shortcomings.
Specically, the deciency of having a continuous scale makes it unfeasible to calculate (i) the
relative riskiness of a system in non-crisis periods, and/or (ii) the strength of a crisis once it
occurs, with any accuracy. If the former could be quantied, it may allow for early corrective
action as the menace of a systemic crisis increases. On the other hand, quantication of the
latter can smooth the progress of decision making relative to the most suitable course of action
to ght the crisis. As Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) state "a precondition for improving the
analysis and management of nancial (banking) stability is to be able to construct a metric for it".
Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) do construct a metric for nancial stability, which they call the
PAO ("probability that at least one bank becomes distressed"). However, the PAO only reects
the probability of having at least one extra distress, without specifying the size of the systemic
impact. The nancial stability perspective taken herein is that multiple risk factors "fail" due to
a common risk exposure (see de Bandt and Hartmann, 2000; Allen et al., 2009 for comprehensive
surveys on systemic risk modeling).
The well-being of the banking sector, as designated by the balance sheet items, is (arguably)
reected in credit default swap spreads, since CDSs are a type of insurance against credit risk.2
However, it is worth pointing out that there are those who argue against the reliability of CDS
2A CDS is similar to a put option written on a corporate bond, and like a put option, the buyer is protected
from losses incurred by a decline in the value of the bond stemming from a credit event. Accordingly, the CDS
spread can be viewed as a premium on the put option, where payment of the premium is spread over the term of
the contract. More specically, CDS spreads are considered as determinants of default risk as well as liquidity risk
(Das and Hanouma, 2006; Hull et al., 2004). Moreover, a long stream of research, starting with Merton (1974),
has established a strong link between credit risk markets and equity markets.
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Figure 2: Daily CDS Spreads (in basis points)
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spreads as a trustworthy indicator of a rmsnancial health. The main criticism being that CDS
spreads may overstate a rms fundamentalrisk when: (i) the CDS market is illiquid, and (ii)
when the nancial system is frothing with risk aversion. Even though these types of arguments
might be accurate, they can become self-fullling factors if they have a real e¤ect on the eagerness
of the market to nance a particular rm (Segoviano and Goodhart, 2009). Consequently, this
can lead to a real deterioration of a rms nancial health, as we have experienced throughout
the 2007-2010 nancial crisis. Additionally, even though CDS spreads may overshoot, they do
not generally stay wide of the mark for long, where the direction of the move is by and large a
good distress signal (see Figure 2).
Accordingly, the aim herein is to take advantage of the aforementioned properties of the
banking sector in order to epitomize the likelihood for systemic risk, especially during an eco-
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nomic downturn. Moreover, this paper endeavors at going further than the conventional "shock-
transmission" approach, which is the epicenter of many existing frameworks. As an alternative,
the focus herein is on spotting and dealing with the build-up of weaknesses preceding downward
corrections in markets, problems with institutions, or failures in nancial infrastructure. The con-
jecture inherent in this approach is that the shocks that may ultimately cause such adjustments
are (usually) considered less relevant when viewed in isolation, and therefore, are often overlooked.
This also accords with the view that nancial stability is a continuum (Houben et al., 2004), in
which "imbalances" may develop and then either fritter away or build up to the point of moving
any nancial system away from stability.
The starting point in this approach is the stylized fact that the return series of nancial
assets are fat-tailed distributed; therefore, the commonly maintained assumption that returns
are normally distributed leads to an underestimation of risk. Hence, given the focus on extreme
co-movements of risk, I will allow for fat-tails to capture the univariate risk properties. For
the multivariate analysis, the normal distribution based correlation concept is also of limited
value, since regular dependence and tail dependence are independent (see Garita and Zhou, 2009).
For these and the above-mentioned reasons, the research herein will calculate the conditional
probability of joint failure (CPJF) and a risk-stability index (RSI) derived from multivariate
extreme value theory (mEVT ), which quanties systemic risk in a nancial system.
This index is based on forward-looking price information stemming from credit default swap
(CDS) spreads, which are easily available in real time and on a daily basis; moreover, it is also
economically instinctive, since it is comparable to a notional premium (i.e. to a risk-weighted
deposit insurance plan that protects against harsh losses in the banking system). This new index
also has the property that it increases when the conditional probability of joint failure and the
dependence structure increase. In other words, higher systemic risk (i.e. an increase in the risk-
stability index) reects an elevated sensitivity by market participants regarding higher failure risk,
as well as their view that the conditional probability of joint failure is higher. In addition, the
risk-stability index reveals the importance of di¤erent risk factors (e.g. banks) in causing systemic
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risk, where the potential for a systemic breakdown of the nancial system can be either weak or
strong (see de Vries, 2005), depending on whether the "conditional probability of joint failure"
fades away or remains asymptotically (see Garita and Zhou, 2009). Accordingly, the international
monetary and nancial system can be described as being relatively stable in the former case, while
in the latter case it is more fragile.3
By applying a multivariate extreme value theory (mEVT ) methodology to a portfolio com-
posed of 30 banks from around the world, I show that extreme dependence, whether it be
relationship-specic or system-wide, varies from period to period, thereby lending support to
the idea that nancial stability is a continuum. The CPJF-based results indicate that banks are
highly interlinked especially within geographical borders; corroborating Hartmann et al. (2007),
who argued that in a more integrated banking system (e.g. the U.S. or Korea) area-wide systemic
risk is higher, and that the lower overall spillover risk in Europe is due to the weak extreme cross-
border linkages. The results also show that Asian banks seem to experience the most persistence
of distress, followed by U.S. banks, which are in turn followed by European banks. The results
stemming from the risk-stability index show that, on average, Asian banks create slightly more
instability to the nancial system, followed by U.S., and then by European banks. The panel-data
VAR indicates that the RSI is negatively and signicantly associated with the federal funds rate
and the term-spread (dened as the di¤erence between the 10 year and 3 month treasury con-
stant maturity rate); this suggests that monetary policy can help reduce instability in a nancial
system.
The remainder of the paper evolves as follows: Section 2 will discuss the measures of depen-
dence employed herein. Section 3 provides empirical results for the CPJF, while section 4 provides
the results for the risk-stability index. Section 5 looks at the directionality of contagion and the
persistence of distress. Section 6 takes advantage of the time-series properties of the Risk-Stability
Index, and estimates a panel VAR. Lastly, section 7 concludes.
3It is imperative to point out that random variables are asymptotically independent or asymptotically dependent
despite their correlation. Moreover, the dependency of random variables, if they are asymptotically independent,
will eventually die out as the credit spreads become extreme.
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2 Measures of Dependence
In order to understand the dependence between two normally distributed random variables, it is
su¢ cient to know the mean, variance and correlation coe¢ cient. However, the correlation coe¢ -
cient is not a useful statistic for nancial data for various reasons. First, economists are interested
in the risk-return trade-o¤ for which the correlation measure is only an intermediate step; that is,
the correlation coe¢ cient measures dependence during normal times, and it is largely dominated
by the moderate observations rather than the extreme observations. Boyer et al. (1997) show that
even if the normal distribution is applicable, verifying "the market speak" of increased-correlations
during crisis times, can be illusory at best. To make the point more precise, Forbes and Rigobon
(2002) show that even after adjusting for heteroskedastic biases (i.e. increases in variance), "there
was virtually no increase in unconditional correlation coe¢ cients" during times of crisis. Second,
the denition of the correlation coe¢ cient depends on the assumption of nite variance; however,
the distribution of nancial data (e.g. asset returns) is not multivariate normally distributed,
that is, the tails of the return distributions are "fat". Thirdly, the multivariate normal-based
correlation does not measure very well the extreme dependence of nancial data; therefore, what
is required is a multivariate measure for the tail dependence (for a formal analysis of univariate
EVT, see Embrechts et al., 1997).
2.1 Multivariate EVT: tail dependence
Multivariate EVT (mEVT ) takes into account more than the tail behavior of each individual risk
factor, since it also looks at the extreme co-movements among them. Moreover, this approach
makes it possible to nd (possible) contagion e¤ects stemming from "distress" in one risk factor
in relation to other risk factors in a system. As an example of a two-dimensional case, assume
a system of two banks, with loss returns X and Y . Following de Haan and Ferreira (2006), the
two-dimensional EVT assumes that there exists a G(x; y) such that
G(x; y) = lim
!0
P (X > V aRx()  x; or Y > V aRy()  y)

(1)
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we can express the marginal tail indices as follows:
if y = +1; then G(x;+1) = lim
!0
P (X > V aRx()  x)

= lim
!0
P (X > V aRx()  x)
P (X > V aRx())
= x 1
if x = +1; then G(+1; y) = lim
!0
P (Y > V aRy()  y)

= lim
!0
P (Y > V aRy()  y)
P (Y > V aRy())
= y 2
by using these marginal tail indices, we can remove the marginal information by simply changing
x into x 
1
1 and y into y 
1
2 , yielding
G(x; y) = lim
!0
P (X > V aRx()  x 
1
1 ; or Y > V aRy()  y 
1
2 )

(2)
Notice that V aRx(x)  V aRx()  x 
1
1 and V aRy(y)  V aRy()  y 
1
1 , which allows us to
write (1) as follows:
lim
!0
P (X > V aRx(x); or Y > V aRy(y))

= L(x; y) = L(1; 1) for x = y = 1 (3)
Through (3) we can notice that the marginal information, which is summarized by the tail indices
1; 2, has no inuence on L(x; y). In other words, the two-dimensional EVT condition models the
marginals through one-dimensional EVT and it models the tail dependence through the L(x; y)
function. As noted by de Haan and Ferreira (2006), 1  L(1; 1)  2. A value for L(1; 1) equal to
1 indicates complete tail dependence. If L(1; 1) equals 2, then it indicates tail independence. In
the case there is an interest in looking at a multidimensional setting (e.g. the e¤ects of one banks
failure on the rest of the nancial system), as is the case in this paper, then equation (3) can be
modied accordingly. Let X = (X1; :::; Xd) denote the losses of d individual risk factors, where
each risk factor Xi follows a univariate EVT setup with its own tail index i and scale function
ai(t). Therefore, for any x1; x2; :::; xd > 0, as  ! 0, we have:
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P (X1 > V aR1(x1); or X2 > V aR2(x2); or; :::; or Xd > V aRd(xd))

= L(x1; x2; :::; xd) (4)
However, this time around the values will be delimited between 1 and the number of risk factors
d; the estimation procedure follows Huang (1992).
2.2 Risk-Stability Index (RSI)
Building on the mEVT framework previously discussed, I construct a risk-stability index based
on Garita and Zhou (2009) and Zhou (2009). This index makes it possible to quantify the e¤ect
that a "failure" of any risk factor can have on an entire nancial system, be it economy-wide or
worldwide. Another way of looking at the index is as an estimation of the number of risk factors
that would "fail", given that a specic risk factor "fails" (i.e. which risk factor failure will have
the most adverse e¤ect on a nancial system). For expositional purposes on the construction of
the RSI, assume that the nancial system consists of three banks. From equation (4) we know
that
P (X1 > V aR1(x1); or X2 > V aR2(x2); or X3 > V aR3(x3))

= L(x1; x2; x3)
For bank Xi, the RSI is dened as:
RSI = lim
!0
E(number of crises in X2 and X3 j X1 is in crisis) (5)
Denote  = 1fXi > V aRi()g as Xi being in crisis, for i = 1; 2; 3. Using this to rewrite (5), we
obtain:
RSI1 = lim
!0
E(2 + 3 j 1 = 1) (6)
Note that the above expression can be rewritten as the sum of two expectations as follows:
E(2 j 1 = 1) + E(3 j 1 = 1) (7)
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Rewriting (7) in terms of probabilities, and by using equation 13 (see Appendix A) we get:
RSI1 = lim
!0
P (2 = 1 & 1 = 1)
P (1 = 1)
+
P (3 = 1 & 1 = 1)
P (1 = 1)
= lim
!0
2   P (2 = 1 or 1 = 1)

+
2   P (3 = 1 or 1 = 1)

(8)
By using equation (4) in the above expression, it is easy to show that:
RSI1 = 2  (d  1) 
X
i 6=j
Li;j(1; 1) (9)
or in the three-bank example:
RSI1 = 2  L(1; 1; 0) + 2  L(1; 0; 1)
= 4  L(1; 1; 0)  L(1; 0; 1)
An RSI close to d  1 means that risk-factor i has a high inuence on the nancial system, while
an RSI close to 0 implies a negligible inuence of risk-factor i on the nancial system.
2.3 Data
Choosing the data is more often than not a subjective approach, since one has to choose between
having a maximum number of risk-factors, and having a maximum amount of (time) observations.
The analysis to follow is based on 30 major banks (11 Asian banks, 12 European banks, 6 U.S.
banks, and 1 Canadian bank), for which the decision to include these banks was made on the
amount of observations. Accordingly, the daily CDS spreads (all at 5-year maturity in USD) range
from February 1, 2002 until July 22, 2010, and are obtained from Markit. In order to show the
evolution of "(in)stability", a 500-day sub-sample moving (weekly) window is used to construct a
time-series for both the CPJF and the Risk-Stability Index.
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3 Conditional Probability of Joint Failure
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is imperative to calculate the number of high-ordered
statistics k, by using an estimator for L(1; 1) and plotting the results of L(1; 1) for di¤erent k and
for all the bilateral relationships. This is the same technique as for choosing the tail-index with a
Hill-plot, in which we have a trade-o¤ between "too small" or "too large" k. If k is "too small",
then we choose too few observations and the variance of the estimator is large. If on the other
hand, k is "too large", then we are incorporating "non-extreme" observations (i.e. observations
from the middle of the distribution), and therefore we would impose a bias to our estimator. The
solution to this trade-o¤ is to make a "Hill-plot" (see Hill, 1975), and to let the tail speak for
itself. The solution to this trade-o¤ for each bilateral relationship yields a k = 45, which implies
a quantile of  = k
n
= 9%4 .
As is well known, assessing the exact point in time when "liquidity risk" turns to "solvency
risk", is di¢ cult at best, and disentangling these risks is a complex issue. Additionally, note that
more often than not, CDS not only cover the event of default of an underlying asset, but they
also cover a wider set of "credit events" (e.g. downgrades). I consider the combined e¤ects of
these factors, which are inherent in CDS spreads, to encapsulate "distress" or "failure" risk (i.e.
large losses and the possible default of a specic bank).5 I measure systemic risk in a bivariate
setting through the conditional probability of joint failure (see Appendix and Garita and Zhou
2009). The CPJF always lies between 0 and 1. If it is zero, then the probability of joint failure is
negligible; however, if it is one, then the "failure" of a risk factor in a portfolio will always go hand
in hand with the downfall of the other risk factor. An important point to keep in mind before
proceeding, is that conditional probabilities do not necessarily imply causation (I will deal with
causation and directionality in section 5); however, this set of bilateral conditional probabilities
of joint failure do provide important insights into the interlinkages and the likelihood of contagion
between banks in a portfolio (i.e. in a nancial system).
4I also performed the analysis with a 200 day sub-sample moving (weekly) window. The quantile for this
exercise was  = 20200 = 10%. Moreover, the results that follow stayed relatively unchanged.
5In other words, "failure" is used extremely loosly, and at its most basic level, it should be interpreted as "if a
bank sneezes, will the system catch a cold?".
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3.1 Common Distress in "Local" Banking Systems
The results found in this subsection indicate that banks within a geographical area are highly
interlinked, with distress in one bank clearly associated with a high conditional probability of
joint failure elsewhere in the "local" system. Moreover, the degree of extreme dependence varies
from period to period as illustrated by Figures 3 and 4, which present the detailed bilateral
interconnections between 7 major South Korean banks (Figure 3) and between 6 major U.S.
banks (Figure 4).
Figure 3: Conditional Probability of Joint Failure between 7 Major South Korean Banks. (the dashed
vertical gray line indicates when Lehman Brothers led for bankruptcy).
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For South Korean banks, Figure 3 indicates that these banks have experienced around 5
episodes of "high" bilateral distress between January 2004 and July 2010. The most current
bout of bilateral distress began as early as the fourth quarter of 2006, following a relatively calm
6-month period; the average CPJF among Korean banks before September 2006 was 0:46; it was
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0:58 between October 2006 and June 2009; and it was 0:33 after June 2009. Figure 4 shows that
U.S. banks follow a similar pattern as South Korean Banks; however, U.S. banks (mainly between
Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, and Morgan Stanley) were already experiencing high levels of
distress as far back as early 2005. The most current episode of high bilateral distress began to
surface in earnest as early as April 2007. For U.S. banks, the average CPJF before April 2007
was 0:35; it was 0:41 between April 2007 and December 2009; and it has been 0:22 as of January
2010. The last point worth emphasizing is that (the bankruptcy of) Lehman Brothers did not
seem to create any "additional" distress to the bilateral relationships between U.S. banks, since
other banks created just as much, and at times, even more distress than Lehman Brothers.
Figure 4: Conditional Probability of Joint Failure between 6 Major U.S. Banks (the dashed vertical
gray line indicates when Lehman Brothers led for bankruptcy on Sept 15, 2008).
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3.2 Global (in)Dependence - Distress Between Specic Banks
In the previous section we saw that bilateral stress of "local" banks can be quite high. However,
when comparing across regional borders, is one banking system more at risk than another? What
do my indicators say about the relative size of bank contagion risk when comparing economic areas
(e.g. the euro area and the United States). Therefore, in order to gain insight into cross-border
e¤ects, the CPJFs are now calculated between the 6 U.S. banks, the 12 European banks, and the
11 Asian banks. As Figures 5 to 8 underscore, banks around the world are highly interconnected;
furthermore, this interconnection and the degree of bilateral distress varies from varies from period
to period. As it is by now well known, during the 2005  2006 period, the US economy was hit by
various shocks relating to credit markets. More specically, during the fall of 2005, the booming
housing market slowed down abruptly, with median prices nationwide dropping by over 3% from
the fourth quarter of 2005 to the rst quarter of 2006; and by the summer of 2006, the US home
Figure 5: Conditional Probability of Joint Failure between Asian and U.S. Banks (the vertical red line
indicates when Lehman Brothers led for bankruptcy.
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Figure 6: Conditional Probability of Joint Failure between Asian and U.S. Banks cont... (the vertical
red line indicates when Lehman Brothers led for bankruptcy.
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construction index dropped by over 40%, compared to a year earlier. By the rst quarter of 2007
the Case-Schiller housing price index recorded the rst year-over-year decline in house prices since
1991, leading to a collapse of the subprime mortgage industry, to a surge in foreclosure activity,
and rising interest rates that threatened to depress prices further as problems in the subprime
market spread to the near-prime and prime mortgage markets. Intriguingly, a relatively calm
period followed, which seems to be related to the perception of market participants that "things
cannot get any worse"; after all, it was during the summer of 2007 that the Dow Jones Industrial
Average closed above 14,000 for the rst time in its history. However, by the fall of 2007 home sales
in the US continued to fall, marking the steepest decline since 1989, leading to a second period
of high distress among banks, reaching its zenith almost a year and a half later when the onset
of the current nancial crisis was well under way. The aforementioned two periods of distress
clearly emerge in Figures 5-6, where the U.S. nancial distress inuenced the Asian (Korean)
banking system through a number of nancial channels, namely (i) tighter credit availability due
to the increased uncertainty and the reduction of available funds in international markets, (ii) the
increase in LIBOR, which restricted banks short-term access to international funds in general
and dollars in particular. The most a¤ected relationships on average, during 2007   2008, were
between BOA and Woori (CPJF = 0:52), Morgan Stanley and KEXIM (CPJF = 0:52).6
Links between European and U.S. banks also show a tendency to oscillate from period to
period (see Figures 7 and 8). Interestingly, these gures also show two periods of "high" bilateral
distress surrounding "the great recession". As we already know, it was during the summer of
2007 when subprime mortgage backed securities were discovered in the balance sheet of European
banks, leading to high levels of bilateral distress, which, according to the gures, lasted until the
summer of 2008 (just before Lehman Brothers led for bankruptcy). The results indicate that the
average CPJF between European and U.S. banks, between the summer of 2007 and the summer
of 2008, was 45%. However, the highest CPJFs during this period were between Morgan Stanley
and UBS (average CPJF = 0:55), Citi and UBS (average CPJF = 0:53), Bank of America and
UBS (average CPJF = 0:52), and between Bank of America and HSBC (average CPJF = 0:50).
6See appendix A3 for a graphical representation between Asian and European banks.
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Figure 7: Conditional Probability of Joint Failure between European and U.S. Banks (the vertical red
line indicates when Lehman Brothers led for bankruptcy).
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Figure 8: Conditional Probability of Joint Failure between European and U.S. Banks cont... (the
vertical red line indicates when Lehman Brothers led for bankruptcy).
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The second period of particular interest (as highlighted by Figures 7 and 8) ranges from
January 2006 until the spring of 2007, which can be viewed as a prelude to "the great recession".
During this period, the average CPJF was "only" 0:20. However, when we look at individual
relationships, we nd evidence that the following banks were already quite distressed as early as
January 2006: JPMorgan and UBS (average CPJF = 0:44), Citi and UBS (average CPJF =
0:43), JPMorgan and BNP Paribas (average CPJF = 0:42), and Bank of America and UBS
(average CPJF = 0:41). It is also quite interesting to uncover that Lehman Brothers was not
"more" systematically important than other banks; of course, this does not mean that Lehman
Brothers was "safe" bank, since its highest CPJF, in this latter period, was with UBS (average
CPJF = 0:31), and with BNP Paribas (average CPJF = 0:30). In the former period, the period
between July 2007 and June 2008, Lehman Brothers also experienced high levels of distressed
with UBS (average CPJF = 0:49).
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Table 1: Average CPJF Between Banks Within and Across Regions
Before August 2007
Asia Banks Asia-ex Kor-Banks Korea Banks Europe Banks USA Banks
Asia Banks 0.38 0.34 0.40 0.19 0.16
Asia-ex Kor-Banks 0.34 0.46 0.28 0.19 0.16
Korea Banks 0.40 0.28 0.47 0.19 0.16
Europe Banks 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.16
USA Banks 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.34
Between August 2007 and July 2009
Asia Banks Asia-ex Kor-Banks Korea Banks Europe Banks USA Banks
Asia Banks 0.46 0.41 0.49 0.34 0.25
Asia-ex Kor-Banks 0.41 0.52 0.35 0.33 0.34
Korea Banks 0.49 0.35 0.57 0.35 0.36
Europe Banks 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.43 0.36
USA Banks 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.50
Between July 2009 and July 2010
Asia Banks Asia-ex Kor-Banks Korea Banks Europe Banks USA Banks
Asia Banks 0.21 0.16 0.24 0.07 0.08
Asia-ex Kor-Banks 0.16 0.30 0.08 0.07 0.06
Korea Banks 0.24 0.08 0.33 0.07 0.09
Europe Banks 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.16 0.07
USA Banks 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.22
Table 1, which gives the average conditional probability of joint failure between banks within
and across borders, highlights four main points: (1) "risks" vary by geographical region; (2) within
border bilateral distress is higher than across borders on average, with Koreas banking system
being more highly interconnected, followed by the US banking system; (3) regional cross-border
contagion is also relatively high, but not as high as within borders; and (4) global contagion
is present and clearly an issue. These results, which corroborate the results by Hartmann et al.
(2007), indicate that in much more integrated banking systems (e.g. Korea and the United States),
economy-wide systemic risk is higher, as banking business is much more interconnected. In other
words, the lower spillover risk in Europe is explained by the quite weak extreme cross-border
linkages. Moreover, the results also indicate that nancial stability must be managed inside-out
(within borders rst), but that international coordination is extremely important.7
7The CPJF results also show that regulatory capital requirement rules must be aligned more closely to the
underlying risks that individual banks face, since the conditional probability of joint failure varies from period to
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4 Distress to Financial System Linked to a Specic Bank
As explained in section 2:4, the risk-stability index makes it possible to quantify the (contempo-
raneous) e¤ect that a "failure" of any risk factor can have on an entire nancial system, be it
economy-wide or worldwide. In simple terms, the risk-stability index gives an estimation of the
number of risk-factors that would "catch a cold", given that a specic risk-factor "sneezes", by
allowing us to pin-point which risk factor failure will most adversely a¤ect a nancial system. A
risk-stability index (equation 9) close to d  1 means that risk-factor i has a high inuence on the
nancial system, while an RSI close to 0 implies a negligible e¤ect of risk-factor i on a portfolio
(or any nancial system); therefore, the higher the index, the higher the instability of a portfolio
or system.
Figure 9: Risk Stability Index Time-Series for 11 Major Asian Banks (the dashed vertical gray line
indicates when Lehman Brothers led for bankruptcy).
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period. Therefore, imposing a "one size ts all" approach can actually lead to more instability.
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Figure 10: Risk Stability Index Time-Series for 18 Major European and US Banks (the dashed vertical
gray line indicates when Lehman Brothers led for bankruptcy).
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An immediate result that stands out is the similarity between the RSI and the CPJF graphs.
Clearly, the CPJFs and the RSI move in tandem, indicating that as bilateral distress starts to
build-up, so does the risk to the nancial system (but also, as the nancial system starts to
experience increased levels of distress, so do the bilateral relationships). The results also show
that, on average, banks tend to a¤ect about 10 other banks, on average, with Asian banks having
an infection rate of 33% (Korean banks a¤ect 35% of banks, on average). Asian banks are followed
by European and U.S. banks, with an infection rate of 29% each. However, looking at averages
masks the fact that risk varies from period to period, but also that nancial instability can arise
from anywhere, irrespective of geographical location.
For example, during October 2004, almost all Asian banks were a¤ecting close to 20 other
banks, with DBS a¤ecting "only" 15 other banks (see Figure 9). A similar patter can be found for
European banks, but with Unicredito being the "less" risky bank (see Figure 10). Interestingly,
during this same period, U.S. banks were each a¤ecting less than 5 other banks, and it was not
until the beginning of 2005 that most U.S. banks started to systematically impact the nancial
system (with each bank a¤ecting well over 10 other banks); the exception was JPMorgan, who
was only a¤ecting about 2 other banks, and it was not until the spring of 2005 that JPMorgan
increased its infection rate to over 10 banks (see bottom panel of Figure 10).
From Figures 9 and 10, we can also discern the height of the nancial (banking) crisis. These
gures indicate that for most Asian banks, the height of the crisis occurred in April 2008. However,
for DBS, Mizuho, and Tokyo Mitsubishi, the height of the crisis was in late 2007 (with Nomura
impacting the system with similar fervor during these two periods). Interestingly, European banks
show a similar twin-peak pattern as Nomura, with the rst peak reaching its zenith (of around
25 banks a¤ected, on average, by each European bank) in September 2007; while the second peak
reached similar heights around April 2008. U.S. banks display the same twin-peak pattern as
European banks (see Figure 10). Intriguingly, the bottom panel of Figure 10 shows that at the
time of its demise, Lehman Brothers was not creating any more instability than any other U.S.
bank; it was actually creating slightly less instability than Citi, Goldman Sachs, and JPMorgan.
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5 Directionality and Persistence of Distress
Another aspect of particular interest regarding nancial stability is the directionality and the
persistence of distress. Accordingly, this section aims at uncovering the aforementioned issues by
employing, for tractability purposes, 8 periods of 500 days (with a one-year overlap). The results
of this particular exercise are presented through Figure 11, which shows how the directionality
of contagion to the nancial system has evolved through time.8 In other words, the gure shows
how many banks will "fail", given that bank "i" "failed" one period before.
Figure 11: Directionality of Contagion - the gure shows the consequences to the banking system
conditional on bank i "failing" one period before (see footnote 8 for period coding). For example,
1   2 (on the x-axis) shows the repercussion to the system in period 2, given that bank i "fails" in
period 1.
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8The x-axis of Figure 11 is coded as follows: 1 = Feb 1, 2002 to Jan 1, 2004; 2 = Jan 16, 2003 to Dec 15, 2004;
3 = Jan 1, 2004 to Nov 30, 2005; 4 = Dec 16, 2004 to Nov 15, 2006; 5 = Dec 2, 2005 to Nov 1, 2007; 6 = Nov 20,
2006 to Oct 17, 2008; 7 = Nov 6, 2007 to Oct 5, 2009; 8 = Aug 19, 2008 to July 22, 2010.
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For example, in section 3 we uncovered that, during the latter parts of 2007 and early 2008,
UBS was one of the banks with elevated levels of bilateral distress (with an average CPJF of 53%).
Figure 11 indicates that in 2008 at least 10 other banks su¤ered distress due to the fact that UBS
experienced distress on period before. Figure 11 also shows that the failure of Lehman Brothers
did not lead to any major instability of the system, since less than 5 banks su¤ered due to Lehman
Brothers collapsing one period before. Clearly, banks a¤ect a system with a lag; however, what is
most interesting, is that they do so at irregular intervals implying that the system is constantly
under stress, where the source of the stress varies from period to period.
Figure 12: Persistence of Distress - the gure shows the consequences to bank i, given that it "failed"
one period before (see footnote 8 for period coding). For example, 1   2 (on the x-axis) shows the
repercussion to bank i in period 2, given that if "failed" in period 1.
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As previously mentioned, another aspect of particular interest regarding nancial stability
is the persistence of distress for bank i in the portfolio; where persistence is quantied by the
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diagonal of the distress dependence matrices (available upon request), displayed here as Figure
12. This gure indicates that the Japanese bank Mizuho tends to experience the most distress
persistence (average CPJF = 78%), followed by Lehman Brothers (average CPJF = 36%)
from the USA, and then by Woori (average CPJF = 32%), Shinhan (average CPJF = 30%),
and Kookmin (average CPJF = 28%), all from South Korea. At the lower end of persistence
are the Swiss banks CreditSuisse (average CPJF = 4%) and UBS (average CPJF = 5%),
followed by ING(average CPJF = 5%), Unicredito (average CPJF = 5%), and JPMorgan
(average CPJF = 6%). In conjunction, the DDMs and Figure 12 also show that within regions,
Asian banks tend to experience the most persistence of distress, on average, with a 22% conditional
probability of joint failure at time t, given that the same Asian bank experienced distress at t  1
(South Korean banks experience a 25% CPJF). Asian banks are followed by U.S. banks with a
16% CPJF, and then by European banks with an 10% CPJF, on average.
Across regions, Table 2 indicates that Korean banks are the most contagious, with an average
CPJF of 20:3%. They are followed by U.S. banks (average CPJF = 17%), and then by European
banks (average CPJF = 12%). On the other hand, the biggest generator of contagious bilateral
distress for Asian banks are U.S. banks, with a CPJF of 18%. The abovementioned results indicate
that in a much more integrated banking system, such as the one in Korea and the United States,
economy-wide systemic risk is higher, as banking business is much more interconnected. In other
words, the lower spillover risk in Europe is explained by the quite weak extreme cross-border
linkages (see Hartmann et al., 2007).
Table 2: Directionality of Contagion CPJF Within and Across Regions
Asia Bankst Asia-ex-Kor-Bankst Kor. Bankst Europe Bankst US Bankst
Asia Bankst 1 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.17
Asia-ex.Kor-Bankst 1 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.14 0.14
Kor. Bankst 1 0.23 0.21 0.25 0.20 0.20
Europe Bankst 1 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.11
US Bankst 1 0.18 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.16
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6 VAR Analysis
This section implements a panel-data vector autoregression methodology (see Holtz-Eakin et al.,
1988; Love and Ziccino, 2006) in order to uncover the feedback e¤ect from the banking system
to the rest of the economy. This procedure merges the traditional VAR and panel-data method-
ologies, by allowing for endogeneity and for unobserved individual heterogeneity. However, when
applying the VAR approach to panel data, it is crucial that the underlying structure be the same
for each cross-sectional unit (Love and Ziccino, 2006). Since this constraint is likely to be violated
in practice, one way to overcome the restriction is to allow for individual heterogeneity; that is
by introducing xed e¤ects in the levels of the variables. However, due to the lags of the depen-
dent variables, the xed e¤ects are correlated with the regressors; therefore, the usual approach
of mean di¤erencingwould create biased coe¢ cients. Therefore, in order to avoid this problem,
the panel VAR methodology uses forward mean-di¤erencing, also known as the "Helmert proce-
dure" (see Arrellano and Bover, 1995; Love and Ziccino, 2006). This transformation preserves
the orthogonality between the transformed variables and the lagged regressors; thereby allowing
the use of the lagged regressors as instruments and the estimation of the coe¢ cients through a
system GMM.
The impulse-response functions describe the reaction of one variable to the innovations in
another variable in the system, while holding all other shocks equal to zero. However, since
the actual variancecovariance matrix of the errors is unlikely to be diagonal, it is necessary to
decompose the residuals in such a way that they become orthogonal, in order to isolate shocks
to one of the variables in the system. The usual convention is to adopt a particular ordering
and allocate any correlation between the residuals of any two elements to the variable that comes
rst in the ordering.9 The identifying assumption is that the variables that come earlier in
the ordering a¤ect the following variables contemporaneously, as well as with a lag, while the
variables that come later a¤ect the previous variables only with a lag. In other words, the
variables that appear earlier in the system are more exogenous, and the ones that appear later
9The procedure is known as the Choleski decomposition of the variancecovariance matrix of residuals, and is
equivalent to transforming the system into a recursiveVAR (see Hamilton, 1994).
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are more endogenous. Finally, to analyze the impulse-response functions we need an estimate of
their condence intervals. Since the matrix of impulse-response functions is constructed from the
estimated VAR coe¢ cients, their standard errors need to be taken into account. Accordingly,
the standard errors of the impulse response functions and the condence intervals are generated
through Monte Carlo simulations.
The panel VAR employs the RSI time-series (see Figures 9-10), and the following nancial
market variables (from FRED and CBOE): the short rate (e¤ective federal funds rate), the term
spread (di¤. between 10-year and 3-month Treasury constant maturity rates), the market return
(returns on the S&P500), and the VIX, which is the implied market volatility. The number of
lags in the panel VAR system equals 2, and is selected through the Schwarz Bayesian Information
Criteria.
The reaction of the macroeconomy and the market to banking system shocks are as follows (see
column 1 in Figure 13): an increase of the risk-stability index lowers the federal funds rate, while
increasing the slope of the term structure. This result suggests that monetary policy reacts to
nancial instability concerns. The results of the panel VAR also indicate that a higher conditional
probability of joint failure, and an increased sensitivity of market participants to higher failure
risk deteriorates the general market, by lowering the returns to the S&P500. Last but not least,
the perception of market participants that the VIX is the "fear index" is corroborated by the
results, since a positive shock to the risk-stability index increases the implied volatility of the
market.
As is well known, the VAR framework allows for a feedback e¤ect (see row 4 in Figure 13)
from the macro-economy and the general nancial market to the banking system. This feedback
e¤ect shows that an increase in the federal funds rate (used as a proxy for the global interest
rate) reduces the risk-stability index. This indicates that "leaning against the wind" decreases
the instability of the nancial (banking) system. Moreover, the results also indicate that an
improvement in the returns to the S&P500, as well as a reduction of the VIX (i.e. of market
volatility), reduces the sensitivity of market participants to failure risk.
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The variance decomposition (Table 3) conrms the above-mentioned results. More specically,
the RSI explains about 5:5% if interest rate movements, especially at longer horizons (30 weeks).
However, the RSI only has marginal explanatory power of the returns to the S&P500 and the
VIX. On the other hand, the returns to the S&P500 explain more of the risk-stability index
variation than any other variable (especially at longer time horizons), followed by the VIX.
Figure 13: Impulse-Responses of a one standard deviation shock for 2-lag Panel VAR (errors are 5%
on each side generated by Monte Carlo with 1000 replications). RSI = risk-stability index; FFR =
e¤ective federal funds fate; T.Spread = di¤erence between 10 year and 3 month treasury constant
maturity Rate; SP500 ret = returns on the SP500; VIX = implied volatility of the market.
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Table 3: Variance Decomposition - variation in the row variable explained by column variable
Step-Ahead RSI FFR T.Spread SP500ret VIX
RSI 10 0.947 0.003 0.001 0.040 0.013
FFR 10 0.025 0.470 0.290 0.110 0.110
T.Spread 10 0.046 0.007 0.900 0.030 0.014
SP500ret 10 0.001 0.003 0.060 0.930 0.006
VIX 10 0.003 0.001 0.010 0.710 0.270
RSI 20 0.810 0.004 0.004 0.140 0.043
FFR 20 0.050 0.230 0.340 0.230 0.144
T.Spread 20 0.060 0.020 0.820 0.060 0.035
SP500ret 20 0.001 0.003 0.060 0.930 0.006
VIX 20 0.002 0.001 0.030 0.710 0.260
RSI 30 0.760 0.006 0.006 0.180 0.054
FFR 30 0.050 0.150 0.350 0.300 0.160
T.Spread 30 0.060 0.040 0.730 0.110 0.060
SP500ret 30 0.001 0.003 0.06 0.930 0.006
VIX 30 0.002 0.001 0.040 0.700 0.250
Note: RSI = Risk Stability Index; FFR = E¤ective Fed Funds Rate;
T. Spread = Di¤. between 10 year and 3 month treasury constant maturity
rate; VIX = implied volatility of the market.
7 Conclusion
It is a stylized fact in international (nance) macroeconomics that most nancial data are "fat-
tailed"; meaning that extreme co-movements tend to arise more regularly than predicted on the
basis of the normal distribution. Accordingly, this paper has highlighted an easy methodology for
computing systemic risk caused by risk factors in a portfolio or system; moreover, this methodology
can be easily applied to any risk factor or asset return. This novel approach takes advantage of a
multivariate extreme value setup and the concomitant extreme dependence structure to construct
the conditional probability of joint failure (CPJF) and a risk-stability index (RSI), which are in
turn applied to 30 Asian, European, and U.S. banks. The risk-stability index (RSI) o¤ers good
insight into (1) the sensitivity of market participants in relation to higher failure risk, since it is
higher when the conditional probability of joint failure is higher or when the exposure to common
risk factors increases; and (2) on the level of a risk-based deposit indemnity plan that safeguards
against severe losses in a portfolio or nancial (banking) system.
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The results obtained in this paper show that extreme dependence varies from period to period,
thus supporting the idea that nancial stability is a continuum. The bilateral CPJF-based results
indicate that banks are highly interlinked especially within geographical borders. These results
also show that, on average, Korean banks have a propensity to create and experience higher
systemic risk for themselves, followed by U.S. banks, and then by European banks. These last
set of results corroborate Hartmann et al. (2007), who argued that in a more integrated banking
system (e.g. the United States or Korea) area-wide systemic risk is higher, and that the lower
overall spillover risk in Europe is due to the weak extreme cross-border linkages. The persistence
of distress is also an important variable that must be taken into account when analyzing nancial
stability; accordingly, the results show that Asian banks (mainly South Korean banks) seem to
experience the most persistence of distress, followed by U.S. banks, which are in turn followed by
European banks.
Interestingly, the risk-stability index does not corroborate the idea that the "failure" of Lehman
Brothers caused any additional distress to the nancial system. However, the results highlighted
in this paper clearly indicate that the decision of central banks from around the world not to let
any other nancial institution "fail" was the right decision, since "domino-e¤ects" appear to be
long-lived, and severe; thereby impacting not only domestic markets, but also nancial systems
from around the world. Another aspect that has been much talked about by economists and
regulators is that regulation must be aimed at institutions that are "too big to fail". However,
while not directly tested, the results herein indicate that "too big to fail" does not seem to be
a major factor in explaining instability of a nancial system. What does seem to be of more
importance is whether nancial institutions are "too interconnected to fail"; but this is something
that future research will have to uncover.
The panel-data vector autoregression results indicate that the risk-stability index is negatively
and signicantly associated with the federal funds rate and the term-spread (dened as the dif-
ference between the 10 year and 3 month treasury constant maturity rate). This suggests that
when monetary policy is "accommodative", most banks move together more closely. By contrast,
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when monetary policy is tightened, banks can be a¤ected di¤erently, depending on their liquidity
positions. The VAR results also show that the risk-stability index and the returns to the S&P500
are negatively and signicantly correlated. This result is intuitive, since the deterioration of the
general market (i.e. lower market returns) increases the sensitivity of market participants vis-à-vis
higher failure risk, as well as their view that the conditional probability of joint failure is higher.
As is well known, the VAR framework allows for a feedback e¤ect from the banking system to
the macro-economy and the general nancial market. This feedback e¤ect shows that an increase
in the risk-stability index negatively a¤ects interest rates and the returns to the S&P500. Inter-
estingly, the former result suggests that interest rate policy may be a¤ected by nancial stability
concerns in practice. As a nal point, the positive correlation between the risk-stability index and
the VIX index is well-matched with market participantsperception that VIX is the "fear index".
The macro-prudential view, which elicits explicit supervision of "asset prices" and the stability
of the nancial system, has by now gained wide acceptance among economists. Nonetheless,
implementing macro-prudential regulation depends, largely, on the operational feasibility. Despite
this obstacle, the research herein o¤ers a good foundation and a useful starting point towards
understanding the rapport between nancial (in)stability, monetary policy, and the real economy.
The results herein indicate that the monitoring of nancial stability within and between economies
should be a counter-cyclical continuous process; and that this analysis must be wide-ranging,
probing all risk-factors that inuence the nancial system. Furthermore, it should be intended at
the early detection of nancial vulnerabilities, which can arise (from) anywhere and at any time,
as this paper has underscored.
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Appendix
A1 - Conditional Probability of Joint Failure
Garita and Zhou (2009) dene the "conditional probability of joint failure" (CPJF), which is a
special measure of two-dimensional tail dependence, as follows: given that at least one risk-factor
"fails", the CPJF is dened as the conditional probability that the other risk-factor will also
"fail". Let X = (X1; X2; :::; Xd) represent the losses of d number of individual risk factors, then,
the corresponding V aR (value at risk) at probability level  of any two variables are V aRi() and
V aRj(). We then dene:
CPJF i;j= lim
!0
P (X i> V aRi() and Xj> V aRj()jX i> V aRi() or Xj> V aRj()) (10)
which can be rewritten as
CPJFij = E[j  1]  1 (11)
where
E[j  1] = lim
!0
P (Xi > V aRi()) + P (Xj > V aRj())
1  P (Xi  V aRi(); Xj  V aRj()) (12)
is the dependence measure introduced by Embrechts et al. (2000), and rst applied by Hartman
et al. (2004). Under the mEVT framework, the limit in (10) and (12) exists (see de Haan and
Ferreira, 2006, Ch. 7). A higher CPJF between two risk-factors indicates that a "failure" of these
two institutions is more likely to occur at the same time; moreover, the CPJFs may vary, which
highlights the di¤erent linkages during crisis periods. In the two-dimensional case, the CPJF can
be written as
CPJF = lim
!0
P (X1 and X2)
P (X1 or X2)
= lim
!0
P (X1) + P (X2)  P (X1 or X2)
P (X1 or X2)
= lim
!0
 +    L(1; 1)  
L(1; 1)  
=
2
L(1; 1)
  1 (13)
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A2 - Descriptive Statistics
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of CDS Spreads (in bps) for 30 Major Banks
Bank N Mean SD Skew. Kurt. Min Max
BBVA 2206 45.65 51.08 1.93 7.22 7.77 308.05
BNP Paribas 2207 32.59 31.40 1.37 4.15 5.33 170.74
BOA 2207 60.68 66.65 1.86 6.67 8.09 400.25
Citi 2207 93.48 127.22 2.23 8.25 7.31 697.62
Credit Suisse 2176 54.85 49.55 1.41 4.61 9.01 267.19
DBS 2173 40.05 38.76 1.87 6.56 4.06 223.06
Deutsche Bank 2207 47.22 42.91 1.22 3.39 9.44 205.11
Erste 2042 71.78 88.58 1.89 6.93 9.90 503.73
Goldman Sachs 2207 84.31 84.24 2.20 8.37 18.49 633.10
Hana 2060 115.23 125.76 2.36 8.77 13.25 863.00
HSBC 2207 40.60 41.02 1.45 4.44 5.06 212.31
IBK 2010 102.77 116.39 2.42 9.30 12.60 848.13
ING 2190 44.20 41.45 1.44 4.19 4.37 205.20
JPMorgan 2207 58.81 42.00 1.32 4.55 11.41 250.23
KDB 2206 95.35 105.44 2.71 11.33 12.32 841.40
KEXIM 2206 94.16 104.30 2.71 11.31 11.93 832.18
Kookmin 2190 106.76 112.05 2.50 10.01 12.40 857.39
Lehman Brothers 1727 71.42 79.97 3.10 15.20 18.41 739.64
Mizuho 2014 56.42 44.17 0.61 2.09 5.88 180.83
Morgan Stanley 2207 108.37 140.60 3.73 24.97 18.14 1478.20
Nomura 2044 84.41 107.77 2.12 7.11 8.79 487.87
Santander 2207 48.87 47.18 1.35 4.47 7.55 267.29
Scotia 1703 49.67 51.23 1.24 3.00 9.12 169.74
Shinhan 1981 116.43 127.13 2.29 8.39 13.66 852.86
SocGen 2207 40.64 41.79 1.20 3.30 5.86 220.48
Standard Chart. 2176 54.22 60.57 2.25 8.91 5.44 365.87
Tokyo Mitsu. 2207 61.86 50.40 0.85 2.70 5.77 218.00
UBS 2207 52.39 69.27 1.87 6.32 3.96 372.25
Unicredito 1969 49.34 51.94 1.48 4.80 7.30 291.43
Woori 1996 129.99 136.69 2.21 8.12 12.27 881.67
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Table 5: CPJF Descriptive Statistics for 30 Major Banks
Bank Mean SD Skew. Kurt. Min Max
BBVA 0.21 0.24 1.77 5.85 0.00 1.00
BNP Paribas 0.25 0.25 1.49 4.71 0.00 1.00
Bank of America 0.24 0.24 1.46 4.79 0.00 1.00
Citi 0.24 0.25 1.37 4.41 0.00 1.00
Credit Suisse 0.24 0.24 1.52 5.00 0.00 1.00
DBS 0.24 0.24 1.54 5.24 0.00 1.00
Deutsche Bank 0.23 0.23 1.77 6.08 0.00 1.00
Erste 0.25 0.26 1.34 4.17 0.00 1.00
Goldman Sachs 0.22 0.23 1.68 5.77 0.00 1.00
Hana 0.28 0.26 1.27 3.95 0.00 1.00
HSBC 0.24 0.25 1.51 4.74 0.00 1.00
IBK 0.28 0.26 1.24 3.92 0.00 1.00
ING 0.21 0.24 1.74 5.61 0.00 1.00
JPMorgan 0.23 0.24 1.61 5.27 0.00 1.00
KDB 0.28 0.26 1.27 4.03 0.00 1.00
KEXIM 0.27 0.26 1.27 3.99 0.00 1.00
Kookmin 0.28 0.26 1.21 3.83 0.00 1.00
Lehman Brothers 0.23 0.26 1.43 4.52 0.00 1.00
Mizuho 0.26 0.25 1.32 4.17 0.00 1.00
Morgan Stanley 0.23 0.24 1.58 5.17 0.00 1.00
Nomura 0.23 0.25 1.51 4.81 0.00 1.00
Santander 0.24 0.25 1.48 4.73 0.00 1.00
Scotia 0.14 0.21 2.77 11.21 0.00 1.00
Shinhan 0.28 0.26 1.17 3.69 0.00 1.00
SocGen 0.24 0.24 1.50 4.83 0.00 1.00
Standard Chart. 0.26 0.25 1.38 4.42 0.00 1.00
Tokyo Mitsu. 0.26 0.25 1.26 4.02 0.00 1.00
UBS 0.26 0.25 1.36 4.42 0.00 1.00
Unicredito 0.19 0.24 1.86 6.08 0.00 1.00
Woori 0.28 0.26 1.11 3.54 0.00 1.00
Total 0.24 0.25 1.46 4.65 0.00 1.00
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Table 6: RSI Descriptive Statistics for 30 Major Banks
Bank Mean SD Skew. Kurt. Min Max
BBVA 7.92 5.85 1.02 3.42 0.78 26.09
BNP Paribas 9.23 5.66 0.79 2.98 0.96 26.29
Bank of America 8.96 5.84 0.62 2.56 1.09 25.62
Citi 9.04 6.13 0.55 2.34 1.24 25.78
Credit Suisse 8.99 5.81 0.71 2.94 0.56 25.96
DBS 9.07 5.41 0.63 2.77 1.07 26.29
Deutsche Bank 8.67 5.39 0.90 3.37 1.04 25.96
Erste 9.23 6.20 0.67 2.41 1.33 26.29
Goldman Sachs 8.55 5.56 0.71 2.73 0.42 25.58
Hana 10.37 5.38 0.72 2.59 2.67 25.96
HSBC 9.09 5.81 0.80 2.86 1.47 26.11
IBK 10.30 5.47 0.64 2.48 2.42 25.64
ING 7.91 5.94 1.01 3.39 0.40 26.29
JPMorgan 8.55 5.59 0.85 3.03 1.31 25.44
KDB 10.34 5.33 0.64 2.42 2.62 25.64
KEXIM 10.25 5.42 0.65 2.46 2.51 25.64
Kookmin 10.53 5.36 0.62 2.50 2.56 25.96
Lehman Brothers 8.30 6.39 0.49 2.34 0.00 25.62
Mizuho 9.62 5.70 0.52 2.42 1.02 26.29
Morgan Stanley 8.76 5.77 0.79 2.88 0.31 25.78
Nomura 8.74 6.04 0.70 2.71 0.56 25.89
Santander 8.96 5.92 0.72 2.91 0.87 26.09
Scotia 4.93 3.96 0.99 4.10 0.00 20.38
Shinhan 10.52 5.51 0.61 2.33 2.20 25.96
SocGen 9.27 5.62 0.79 2.97 1.62 26.07
Standard Chart. 9.76 5.69 0.60 2.63 1.60 26.29
Tokyo Mitsu. 9.90 5.65 0.44 2.30 1.82 26.29
UBS 9.77 5.59 0.61 2.77 0.80 26.04
Unicredito 7.19 5.87 1.14 3.60 0.24 26.29
Woori 10.45 5.67 0.51 2.25 2.60 25.96
Total 9.11 5.77 0.68 2.71 0.00 26.29
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A3 - CPJF Between Asian and European Banks
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